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Taking Law Seriously
William Gaddis, A Frolic of His Own. New York: Poseidon Press,
1994. Pp. 586. $25.00
Robert Weisberg
A Frolic of His Own is not merely the finest novel ever written
about the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ....
In an era when students who have not paid the dues of reading
Eliot, Yeats, or even Wordsworth claim the privilege of post-
modernist critique, William Gaddis's Frolic may prove temptation or
corrective. It will prove temptation if its howling swirl of discon-
nected voices and its pronouncements about the reducibility of law to
language receive false praise and are condescendingly characterized
as postmodernist. It will prove corrective if viewed as a blessedly old-
fashioned modernist novel, or, better yet, as an even older-fashioned
cri de coeur for personal salvation, if not social justice, as a value still
undeconstructed. Even more fundamentally, it will prove corrective
as a display of linguistic art capable of anger, hysterical humor, and
undeconstructable prose assertion.
As a first step, I will risk naive referentiality in the most literal
sense: I will say what the novel is about. It is about an insanely
neurotic man named Oscar Crease who, like other characters in the
book, cannot overcome his conviction that the justice system is the
best medium for winning recognition of his yearnings, beliefs, and
claims of integrity. As observed by Oscar's sister Christina, the sweet-
souled and tragically realistic demurrer to all overheated plaintiffs in
the book: "the money's just a yardstick isn't it. It's the only common
reference people have for making other people take them as seriously
as they take themselves,...
Though money may be the currency of law according to Christina,
the message of the book is that law itself is the debased currency of
all social relationships. Anyone who has worked in a civil court
knows that the clerk's office regularly receives pleadings filed by
1. WiLLIAM GADDIS, A FROLIC OF HIS OWN 11 (1994).
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paranoid schizophrenics who, using the most elaborately formal legal
language, sue the Pope, the President, the Commissioner of the NFL,
along with other parties, named and unnamed, who are most
demonstrably engaged in a conspiracy against them. From Gaddis's
perspective, the crazed regular courthouse pleader is not so much
aberrant in his mental condition as representative of us all in his
belief that the civil justice system is the best medium for all desperate
hopes for recognition, respect, and solace. The civil complaint is thus
the sonnet of our times. This belief is essentially the theme of A
Frolic of His Own. Indeed, while normal conversation and casual
affective language in the book may be stilted, stereotypical, and
unexpressive, the loonier manipulations of legal jargon are its true
poetry of feeling and idealism.
Oscar, who seems to be sitting around in his bathrobe, eating and
drinking throughout the book, is a middle-aged, occasional history
instructor and playwright living in a frumpy relic of aristocratic real
estate on Long Island. He has become a professional plaintiff, but all
his suits go awry. Oscar sues for personal injury damages because his
own car ran him over, and learns more than he cares to about civil
procedure and tort. More notably, he sues because part of his play,
Once at Antietam, has been appropriated by a sleazeball filmmaker
named Kiester for an extravagantly profitable junk film called The
Blood in the Red, White, and Blue. Oscar's copyright suit leads him
to ask his brother-in-law Harry Lutz to supply a lawyer. Deeply
empathetic but compromised by his own role in the corporate legal
world, Harry supplies a lawyer, Basie, who appears to be at the top
of the class in terms of legal sophistication, even after he is exposed,
or perhaps celebrated, as a mere actor playing the role of lawyer
under false license.
Oscar is the ultimate plaintiff-in part because of the representative
poignancy of his pleas in his magnificently absurd copyright in-
fringement lawsuit, and in part because he is the ultimate defendant:
he literally must sue himself. Oscar stood in front of his car while
trying to start the ignition with a wire; once started, it ran him over.2
Oscar's parlor is a vortex of wildly clashing legal voices, human and
otherwise. Through him or near him are heard lawyers' sleazy
settlement offers; judges' absurdly pompous yet elegantly articulate
renderings of human (and canine) accidents in regal formalism;
lawyers' torturings of formal language in deposition disputes beyond
what is dreamt of in analytic philosophy courses; and lawyers'
pleadings in which the baroque technicalities of the civil complaint
2. GADDIS, supra note 1, at 18.
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ironically capture the frustration of the all-too-human plaintiff. The
copyright suit also invites a second clash of voices, the literary.
Oscar's play is, most notably, itself a work of (legal) plagiarism, since
by his own admission the play is an homage to Plato; less admittedly,
it steals from Camus and Rousseau, and probably infringes Eugene
O'Neill's work. It is also a contemporary Augustan Dunciad
denouncing the Babel-babble of legalistic fools. It is a Sterne-like
comic jaunt.
This book is far too devoted an homage to modernist giants to be
demeaned as a postmodernist critique of the authenticity of the
literary voice. More relevantly, the play within a novel is a terrific
pastiche of modem literature. The melodramatic Once at Antietam
is, at the very least, bad Faulkner. Maniacally interwoven through the
other screaming voices in the novel, Once at Antietam becomes part
of an Eliotic Wasteland and an exuberant Joycean satire-as edited by
Nabokov. Or the play may be what we would have if Joyce were to
capture a satirist capturing how Eliot, in his own homage to Dickens
("he do the police in different voices"3), would rewrite Absalom,
Absalom! The homages here are respectful to the originals, as P. D.
Q. Bach is to Johann Sebastian.
Gaddis also offers an ironic commentary on scholarship that views
legal systems as the media for the expression of plural racial and
ethnic voices; it is also a commentary on the view that law is
redeeming and redeemable if the suppressive dominant discourse
gives way to expressions of the wide variety of human needs and
hopes, and to the telling of a wide variety of human stories. Within
the admittedly narrow social band of Oscar's friends and family,
Gaddis plays out the implications of the "plural voice" or "narrative"
approaches to law by representing what a comic horror we might have
if law served that very purpose.
Not only is A Frolic of His Own somewhat skeptical about
postmodernist voice-pluralism, it is so old-fashioned a modem novel
that it unabashedly has themes, and it is so well-wrought that these
themes connect coherently with its plot and metaphors. Hence it
certainly invites conventionally dry formal analysis or realism-based
social analysis, for those who like that sort of thing. The book is
about divided selves: Oscar sues himself; two substitute soldiers for
Thomas, Oscar's self-representative figure-hero in the play, kill each
3. HE Do THE PoucE IN DIFFERENT VoIcEs is the original title for the first half of THE
WASTELAND, drawn from Dickens's OUR MUTUAL FRIEND. In Dickens's work, the character
Betty Higden says this of the young fellow Sloppy, who, probably representing the young
journalist Dickens himself, could mimic characters he heard in the London courts. THE
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO T. S. ELIOT 213-14 (A. David Moody ed., 1994).
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other at Antietam. It is about racial division turning on itself: the
true elitist in the book is Madhar Pai ("Mudpye"), the East Indian
Anglophile lawyer who insists that Oscar's play requires that the
mysterious character Mr. Kane in Once at Antietam be portrayed as
a Jew in order to heighten racial and ethnic tension. It is about
whether art can be original, but without the chic baggage of
deconstruction. It is about the degradation of art and justice in
vulgar commercial images-and since it truly denounces these, it falls
blessedly short of a postmodernist embrace of the commercial. It is
about art .and justice, law and opera. Most obviously, it is about the
corruption of the ideal and the aspirational by the vulgar. The lunatic
obsessives in the book, and the lunatic obsessions of Oscar in
particular, are "authentic"--or, even better, truly sincere.4  The
obsessions destroy humanity, but they thereby somehow affirm the
nobility of both destroyer and destroyed.
The brooding omnipresence in the book is Oscar's 97-year-old
father, Thomas Crease, judge and son of a more famous judge who
served with Holmes both at Ball's Bluff and on the Supreme Court.
The younger Judge Crease reaches back spiritually (and indeed
physically) to the Holmesian heyday, yet he is still a candidate for
elevation to the Second Circuit. He has lived long enough to be
denounced by a truly postmodernist Republican demagogue who
believes that overturning a jury verdict is an assault on states' rights
(but who is mainly angry because Judge Crease's theory of proximate
cause in tort explicitly excludes "Acts of God"). Judge Crease
somehow blends into Holmes himself as a distant, aloof figure,
available to his progeny only through the agency of his clerk. The
Holmesian-style wisdom partly serves to affirm a Darwinian view of
law, whereby individual yearnings may have to be suppressed to serve
utilitarian ends, yet it also serves a moralistic and admonitory role,
denouncing the crass, selfish instrumentalism of the contemporary
legal system. Oscar yearns for fatherly protection, but all he receives
in the end is a modest bit of help in legal maneuvering: Judge Crease
violates all rules of role-propriety by helping to write the brief that
wins Oscar his appeal on the copyright suit in the very court to which
the judge still aspires.
Perhaps the best lawsuit in the book is that adjudged by Judge
Crease, Szyrk v. Village of Tantamount, in which a vain sculptor's
metallic contraption has accidentally trapped a dog. Judge Crease
indirectly decrees the dog's death when he grants a prohibitory
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injunction against the Village's First-Amendment-threatening effort
to undo the sculpture in order to let out the dog. Just as Oscar
ultimately sues himself, the parties in this lawsuit effectively end up
suing themselves: the village at one point calls for preservation of the
sculpture for its tourist value even when the sculptor himself wants it
dismantled. From his Holmesian-Olympian perspective, Judge Crease
takes a playfully condescending view of the notion of theological
forces in the law. In Judge. Crease's magisterial discourse on
proximate cause, he cites testimony quoted in an earlier case: "God
struck that (expletive) pile of (expletive) with his good old lightning
because it's a (expletive) abomination on this beautiful land the Lord
give us here .... ":'
By "an act of God" the law denotes a natural and inevitable
phenomenon occurring beyond human origin and intervention.
... On the other hand the proceedings in the case here under
appeal were only further inflamed by the brief submitted by an
ironically labeled amicus curiae on behalf of cross-claimant Mr
Szyrk quoting from the writings of E M Cioran "[c]ontemplating
this botched Creation, how can we help incriminating its Author,
how-above all-suppose him able and adroit? Any other God
would have given evidence of more competence or more
equilibrium than this one: errors and confusion wherever you
look!".. With all respect due the parties, the jury, the God fearing
community, and the common man of which it seems to have
more than its share and over half this country's population
planning an afterlife in the felicitous company of Jesus and even
God himself, belief in God has neither bearing upon nor any
relevance to these earthbound proceedings. In short, He may
enjoy as much room in your hearts as you can afford Him, but
God has no place in this court of law.6
As Harry Lutz wisely, sadly, and impotently notes, the legal doctrines
and language play out their own extreme consequences beyond any
sensible human control:
Szyrk got a restraining order while he tries to take it to the high
court so now everybody who was suing him is suing the Village,
James B charging them with detaining and endangering Spot and
now these animal rights people joining in with a writ for unlawful
restraint, sort of a canine habeas corpus with some psychological
expert testifying Spot's having a nervous breakdown.'
5. GADDIS, supra note 1, at 293.
6. Id. at 292-93.
7. Id. at 235-36.
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It takes a wise old judge to look down with Olympian detachment
on this chaos of legal and spiritual competitors, but wry detachment
is all a judge can offer: the world of lawsuits is beyond the logistical
and psychological control of the judicial system even when a wise
judge presides. Litigants require admonitory reminders about
fundamental facts of human and nonhuman nature. As for the
sculptor's claim for damages, to compensate him for the harm done
to the sculpture, Judge Crease says:
Further to this charge, defendants respond, and the court
concurs, citing plaintiff's original artistic intentions, that these
steel surfaces have become pitted and acquired a heavy patina of
rust following plaintiff's stated provision that his creation stand
freely exposed to the mercy or lack thereof of natural forces,
wherewith we may observe that a dog is not a boy, much less a
fireman brandishing an acetylene torch, but nearer in its indif-
ferent ignorance to those very forces embraced in the pathetic
fallacy and so to be numbered among them.'
Judge Crease dismissed the counterclaim that the sculpture was an
attractive nuisance, an "allurement to trespass," and therefore
responsible, by distinguishing precedent involving "a boy similarly
entrapped and provoking a similar outcry until a proffered ten dollar
bill brought him forth little the worse." 9 As Judge Crease says, "a
boy is not a dog."1°
Let me continue hopefully" trying to preempt the postmodernist
take on Gaddis: This is a novel in which characters utter moral
assertions that may indeed be what the novelist wishes us to believe.
Or, this may be a novel in which the novelist believes the characters
are no worse than naive for supporting their moral assertions so
earnestly. As Oscar says of Bagby, the crass Civil War profiteer in his
play:
All this crime, greed, corruption in the newspapers, you think
they're just part of the times we're living today? that our great
Christian civilization is breaking down right before our eyes? It's
just the other way around. These petty swindles of Mr. Bagby's
outfitting the Union army, the only difference is all that was in
tens and hundreds of thousands and today it's in the millions and
billions, false invoices, double billing, staggering cost overruns
8. Id. at 32-33.
9. Id. at 33.
10. Id.
11. Note rare correct use of "hopefully."
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and these six hundred dollar toilet seats all wrapped up like the
American flag? 2
These remarks may be so "situated" and its speaker so fatuous as to
be undeserving of moral credit for this fine rant, but Gaddis un-
reconstructedly believes that this is a meaningful sentiment. In a
similar vein, Oscar says of his play generally (and then has his
sentiment all too typically reduced to a cause of action):
It's the cry of desolation and innocence and, and of sadness and
loss for all humanity in these two men, that they're each other's
victims that's the tragic irony, that's what makes the drama if
there's a scene like this in the movie they stole it didn't they? in
this complaint?
-Right there in the charge of unjust enrichment ... 13
Nor is Gaddis afraid of jokes that are (merely?) jokes. These are
jokes tinged with savagely well-meant political and moral disap-
pointment in the ways of the world: "[W]e're not just suing for
damages you put in reasonable attorney fees too .... -If attorneys'
fees were reasonable do you think Harry would be driving around in
a car like ours?"14 The absurd puns (the sculptor is Szyrk-"sick";
"Crease" may suggest either split personality or furrowed brow)
reveal Gaddis to be confidently bitter, as if humor is an entitlement
of those who can claim the right of righteous indignation.
This is indeed a world where we find, inter alia, a trademark dispute
whereby the Episcopal Church sues Pepsi-Cola for infringement,
claiming that the anagrammatic relationship of their names is no
accident.'" But do not be deceived by the characters' discourse
about legal language:
What do you think the law is, that's all it is, language.
-Legal language, I mean who can understand legal language but
another lawyer, it's like a, I mean it's all a conspiracy, think
about it Harry. It's a conspiracy.
-Of course it is .... Every profession is a conspiracy against the
public, every profession protects itself with a language of its own
16
Words are both cheap and expensive: the sadly wise Christina,
Oscar's sister, is appalled to learn that the federal courts worry about
issues like a trademark-infringing portable toilet called "Here's
12. GADDIS, supra note 1, at 153.
13. Id. at 177.
14. Id. at 183.
15. Id. at 241.
16. Id. at 284.
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Johnny." Harry "corrects" her: "Not talking about portable toilets
Christina we're talking about millions of dollars .... Free speech
about the right of publicity.""7  Gaddis's nasty exposes of legal
language do not really purport to show that "law is ultimately about
language," but that law is, unpostmodernistly speaking, about injustice
or at least the visceral human feel of injustice. Thus, Oscar denoun-
ces the notion of no-fault insurance:
It's not even an idea,'it's a jerrybuilt evasion of reality of course
someone's at fault. Someone's always at fault. It's all a cheap
dodge chewing away at the basic fabric of civilization to replace
it with a criminal mind's utopia where no one's responsible for
the consequences of his actions, isn't that what the social contract
is all about? i"
The point is that even though the legal system is a "jerrybuilt
evasion" of reality, there is a reality to evade. Though the characters
are fools to believe that the legal system they have made or inherited
will bring them justice-or even that they deserve justice-they are
not fools to believe that something like justice could exist and perhaps
has existed. For Gaddis, justice is not quite so distant as Utopia. Yet
it does not rest in the socially constructed pseudo-essentialist tissue of
texts that the postmodernist might smugly describe as justice. It is a
"real ideal" and one which this species should be capable of
achieving, but which, in Gaddis's almost vindictively angry view, this
species has idiotically botched.
The ultimate fear in this book is the flip side of the ultimate hope:
that plaintiffs will win the personal vindication they seek in lawsuits,
and with souls so distorted by their obsession with legal vindication
of their humanity, they will lose it through victory. As Christina
apprehensively wonders:
And if [Oscar] wins? ... What you see in the headlines out of
Washington every day isn't it? caught redhanded destroying
evidence, obstructing justice, committing perjury off on frolics of
their own and when they get off on some technicality, everybody
knows they're guilty but there's not enough there to prove it so
they can proclaim they've been proved innocent, wrap themselves
in the flag and they're heroes because now they believe it
themselves, because the law has vindicated who they think they
are like saying where would Christianity be today if Jesus had
been given ten to twenty with time off for good behavior, and if
17. Id. at 236.
18. Id. at 251.
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he wins? If Oscar wins and this whole cockeyed version of who
he thinks he is vindicated because that's what the law allows? 9
Gaddis is fascinated by how money and speech blend into the
currency of a corrupt world. If the book had addressed the doctrine
of, say, "corporate speech" under the First Amendment,' he would
have denounced the notion of advertising and political bribery
corrupting the ideals of free political speech. He would not, however,
have taken the postmodernist or critical route of saying that even core
political speech is an economic phenomenon, that the distinction
between the commercial and the political is false.
To the extent that the law and literature movement views legal
principles as contigent constructions of language, Gaddis is a skeptical,
only partial member. There is, of course, a more positive theme of
the law and literature movement, the suggestion that viewing law in
literary terms will help us bring greater spiritual enrichment to our
political and ethical efforts. Gaddis offers an equally ambivalent view
of this component. In this regard, the popularity of the law-and-
literature link as a subject for scholarship, or at least the pronounce-
ment of law-and-literature as a major new scholarly enterprise,
reflects a strange contemporary tendency to turn to literature as an
engine of spiritual renewal. Even before postmodernism settled into
our minds as a peculiarly alienated phase of culture, it was often
literature itself that took the form of culture seeking its own lost
innocence. This turn to literature for renewal is ironic, since, as the
great critic Richard Poirier has noted, literature has its own internal
conflicts that are all too representative of the various types of
alienation, malaise, and disbelief which are said to distress modem
culture.2 Thus, as Poirier says, it might make more sense to view
literature as a model of postmodernist confusion than as a cure for it.
The extra irony here is that Gaddis's characters turn to law for the
renewal, affirmation, or "validation" that other phases of life cannot
offer. The great modernist writers who turned to poetry for cultural
redemption were most anxiously aware that literature is something of
a rhetorical house of cards--contrived from earlier models, historically
dependent, and far from historical inevitability, so far so that if we
can imagine the absence of any particular great writer, we must ack-
nowledge that the writing would not have been missed. Gaddis's
characters turn to law to find the deep justifying structure for their
lives and find instead a house of cards.
19. Id. at 398-89.
20. See First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
21. See generally RICHARD POIRIER, THE RENEWAL OF LITERATURE 3-66 (1987).
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As wordy, encrusted, corrupt institutions turn to literature for
renewal, they find writing which is itself committed to conventions,
usages, grammars, structures, and rhetorics, viewed with dismay as the
products of inappropriate systems which often seem artificial or
inappropriate. For Gaddis, those who look to law for renewal also
find wordy, encrusted, corrupt institutions, though he suggests that the
neurosis and narcissism which we sometimes dignify as spiritual crisis
may have corrupted and encrusted a legal system that once served to
lend some dignified order, if not redemptive justice, to society. In the
end, Gaddis's characters demean law by overrating it. Because they
obsessively grasp at its machinery as their hope for salvation, they
corrupt it and are corrupted by it. For Gaddis, we can make the law
as good as we can make ourselves, but it cannot make us better than
we make ourselves.
If there is a climactic encounter in this strangely well-wrought
novel, it is (indirectly) between Oscar and his father. Old Judge
Crease somewhat ambiguously snatches Oscar's lawsuit from the jaws
of defeat. Gaddis then Faulknerianly renders:
It's my grandfather's watch, it was in his pocket he almost forgot
to give it to me. I had to sit there with him while he dragged me
through the whole thing again. Father getting furious when he
saw that lower court decision where Mudpye put one over on
that stupid woman judge and what fools we were not to spot the
trap they laid for us letting us sue in district court here instead of
California preempting the Federal statutes and getting it under
New York law and not even following through with an appeal,
what kind of nitwits were my lawyers anyhow? This old bugger
tried to run them down but they told him my lawyer had gone
fishing and they didn't know anything about that black who
showed up down there trying to register these family letters for
copyright so Father sat down and did it himself. He knew Judge
Bone, knew he'd see right through it but he sat down and wrote
out the appeals brief himself .... maybe Father thought I was a
damn fool, but he came through for me didn't he? snapping the
watch case open, snapping it closed hard and clutching it
there-that he cared about me .... 22
But what does this legacy amount to? We learn that Judge Crease
"forgot" to give his own father's watch to Oscar, too distracted by his
appellate obsessions. His clerk says:
He just chuckled as though it was all, as though it was just a
farce no, no he said, the Judge never gave a damn for things like
22. GADDIS, supra note 1, at 520-21.
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that, all that sentimentality or the movie you wrote he knew they
were just using it to keep him off the circuit court he never
blamed you, he may have thought you were a fool but he never
thought you were venal and he didn't draw up that appeal for
love of anybody, not you or anybody no. It was love of law.
When he got his hands on that decision he was mad as hell. He
acted like the closest person in his life had been raped, like he'd
come on the body of the law lying there torn up and violated by
a crowd of barbarians..., that was him all right, your father, had
me up for two nights digging out every citation that applied and
a hundred more to be sure patching up that appeals brief with
them like bandages wherever there was a scratch on this body he
held dearer than his own life or yours or anyone else's this love
he had for the law ....
Since the plot itself ends with deliberate, whimpering nonfinality, a
better climax to note would be the "self-encounter" of Oscar when he
faces the legal problems of his automobile lawsuit. Since Oscar had
dominion over the car that injured him, and since no one else was
driving it, the insurance agent Gribble, seeking settlement, warns him
of the difficulties of suing oneself, of the law's disdain for suits in
which the plaintiff and defendant are the same, at least in the case of
natural persons: "To put it in plain language you might almost say
that this a suit between who you are and who you think you are, the
question being which one is the plaintiff and which one is the
[defendant]."'  Oscar then asks: "Do you know Montaigne? ...
Where he says it's a hard task to be always the same man ... there
is as much difference between us and ourselves as there is between us
and other people."'  Then the wonderful nonresponsive response:
"I see your point Mr. Crease, but bringing in your friend as a third
party can only complicate things further, unless of course, he might
join the suit as a formal party in establishing negligence as the
proximate cause.,
26
Talk about law and literature!
23. Id. at 559-60.
24. Id. at 544-45.
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